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We propose a theory of firm dynamics in which workers have ideas for new projects that can be sold
in a market to existing firms or implemented in new firms: spin-offs. Workers have private information
about the quality of their ideas. Because of an adverse selection problem, workers can sell their ideas
to existing firms only at a price that is not contingent on their information. We show that the option
to spin off in the future is valuable so only workers with very good ideas decide to spin off and set
up a new firm. Since entrepreneurs of existing firms pay a price for the ideas sold in the market that
implies zero expected profits for them, firms' project selection is independent of their size, which,
under some assumptions, leads to scale-independent growth. The entry and growth process of firms
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We propose a theory of ﬁrm dynamics in which workers have ideas for new projects that
can be sold in a market to existing ﬁrms or implemented in new ﬁrms: spin-oﬀs. Workers have
private information about the quality of their ideas. Because of an adverse selection problem,
workers can sell their ideas to existing ﬁrms only at a price that is not contingent on their
information. We show that the option to spin oﬀ in the future is valuable so only workers
with very good ideas decide to spin oﬀ and set up a new ﬁrm. Since entrepreneurs of existing
ﬁrms pay a price for the ideas sold in the market that implies zero expected proﬁts for them,
ﬁrms’ project selection is independent of their size, which, under some assumptions, leads to
scale-independent growth. The entry and growth process of ﬁrms in this economy leads to an
invariant distribution that resembles the one in the US economy.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The generation and implementation of ideas shape industry dynamics and the structure of ﬁrms.
Ideas can be generated in many diﬀerent contexts, but many important innovations have been
developed by workers of existing ﬁrms. In some cases, workers decide to sell their idea to their
∗We thank Boyan Jovanovic, Chris Phelan, Victor Rios-Rull and seminar participants at the FRB Minneapolis,
NYU Stern, Yale, U Penn, UBC, and IIES Stockholm for useful comments. The views expressed in this paper are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia.
1current employer (or to some other ﬁrm), and in other cases, they use their innovation to start a
new ﬁrm: a spin-oﬀ. Whether an innovation by a worker is implemented within the ﬁrm, leads to
a spin-oﬀ, or is discarded depends on the initial ownership and knowledge of the idea, as well as
the proﬁts that the diﬀerent entities can generate by implementing it. In this paper we propose
a theory of these decisions and, therefore, of ﬁrm dynamics and entry. The theory we propose
takes a clear stance on the determinants of the boundary of the ﬁrm by modeling which ideas
are implemented within the ﬁrm and which ones are not. Our take is that private information
on the expected returns of an idea leads to an adverse selection problem in which the best ideas
give workers incentives to set up new ﬁrms, while ideas that are not as good are sold to existing
ﬁrms at a price that is not contingent on private information but implies zero expected proﬁts for
existing ﬁrms. Hence, we propose a theory that underscores the private information of innovators
as a fundamental determinant of industry dynamics and spin-oﬀs.
In our theory, the selection process induced by private information determines whether an idea
is used within an existing ﬁrm or exploited by setting up a new ﬁrm. The innovator has information
on the mean return of an idea that he cannot credibly convey to ﬁrm management. Hence, the
ﬁrm is willing to pay only a non-contingent price for the project. The inventor can either decide to
create a new ﬁrm or sell the project in the market for ideas. If he does the latter, he can credibly
reveal his information about the project, since there is nothing at stake for him. The ﬁrm can
then decide to implement the idea or not. Implementing a project, either in a spin-oﬀ or within
the ﬁrm, requires one unit of labor. The reason is that to ﬁnd out the realized return of an idea —
that comes from a distribution with mean given by the innovator’s private information — the idea
has to be tried out for one period. The actual realized proﬁt from an idea can be low enough to
make further use of the project non-optimal for the entrepreneurs. In that case, the project will
be dropped next period. If the return on the idea is high enough, the idea is used and provides a
permanent and constant source of proﬁts to entrepreneurs.
If the worker decides to spin oﬀ with an idea, we show that he will exit and return to an
existing ﬁrm as a worker unless the idea pays a return that is strictly higher than an amount that
exceeds the unit labor cost. The reason is that by continuing to use the idea, the worker forgoes
the opportunity of spinning oﬀ with an even better idea in the future. Consequently, workers who
decide to spin oﬀ are more selective than existing ﬁrms when deciding whether to drop a project.
In turn, having this option, which has a positive value, leads workers to be more selective than
existing ﬁrms in deciding which ideas to try out. That is, existing ﬁrms implement ideas with lower
expected value than the ideas workers use to spin oﬀ. In other words, workers decide to forgo their
2wage and the price at which they can sell their idea — if they do not spin oﬀ — only if the idea is
particularly good. Hence the best ideas will result in spin-oﬀsa n dt h en o t - s o - g o o di d e a sw i l lb e
sold to existing ﬁrms. In this sense, our theory determines entry through spin-oﬀsa n dﬁrm growth.
Most of the previous eﬀorts to study ﬁrm dynamics have taken a diﬀerent approach. The seminal
works of Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), and Ericson and Pakes (1995) study ﬁrm dynamics
that result from an exogenous stream of productivity levels. So do more recent papers like Luttmer
(2006), Klette and Kortum (2004), and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2006), although these papers
do endogenize the characteristics of entrants. Firms do not determine their productivity; they act
conditional on it or on what they know about it. In contrast, what we propose is a theory in
which the quality of the projects that ﬁrms implement, as well as the quality of the projects of new
entrants (spin-oﬀs), is determined endogenously by the selection of projects. This mechanism leads
t oat h e o r yo fﬁrm behavior in which ﬁrm dynamics are determined by the quality and quantity of
the implemented projects. Franco and Filson (2006) also provide a theory of spin-oﬀs but focus on
imitation of existing ideas by workers. Silveira and Wright (2007) study the market for ideas in the
context of a search model and analyze its eﬀects on wages and employment. None of these studies
focus on private information and adverse selection as a determinant of entry through spin-oﬀsa n d
t h es i z ed i s t r i b u t i o no fﬁr m s ,w h i c hi st h em a i nf o c u so ft h i sp a p e r .
We show that the set of ideas that entrepreneurs are willing to buy at the non-contingent equi-
librium price does not depend on the size of ﬁrms. Hence, the selection of projects is independent
of size, where size is measured as the number of projects (or workers) in a ﬁrm. The equilibrium
price of an idea is such that any entrepreneur in the economy obtains zero expected proﬁts from
buying an idea in the market, given the set of ideas sold by workers (the ones that do not lead to
spin-oﬀs). Hence, entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent about whether to buy ideas at the market price.
In order for the model to have predictions on ﬁrm growth, and since entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent
about how many ideas to buy in the market, we need to specify the rate at which entrepreneurs
buy ideas. We do this by assuming that they ﬁnd out about ideas for sale in proportion to the size
of the ﬁrm. This may be because the workers in the ﬁrms have ideas themselves or because they
provide information to the entrepreneur about ideas for sale. Independent of what the reason is,
the key argument is that the market for ideas implies that entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent about the
number of projects to buy and so the selection of a project does not depend on the characteristics
of the ﬁrm. In this sense, it is the market for ideas that leads to scale-independent ﬁrm growth
and, together with entry, to a realistic size distribution of ﬁrms. We show that the upper tail of
the size distribution can be arbitrarily close to a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient 1.
3The theory also has predictions for the entry process of ﬁrms. Large ﬁrms generate more spin-
oﬀst h a ns m a l lﬁrms, although as a fraction of the workforce, the number of spin-oﬀsi sc o n s t a n t .
Only the best ideas lead to spin-oﬀs. The model also results in a fraction of unsuccessful spin-oﬀs.
Only these ﬁrms exit the economy. Large ﬁrms can have unsuccessful projects, too, but they just
drop the project. They do not exit, since they have at least one ongoing project that provides a
permanent source of proﬁts.
In the model presented we assume that workers can be hired at a ﬁxed wage, independent of
the size of the industry. This may be an appealing assumption for small industries. Growth of
larger industries, however, is likely to have eﬀects on labor and capital markets, in particular, the
market for specialized skills and industry- or sector-speciﬁc capital. Adding a market for capital
and labor would tend to decrease and eventually stop the development of a particular industry.
This general equilibrium problem is interesting and important, but in this paper, we focus only on
the characteristics of industry dynamics.
There are many famous examples of successful ﬁrms that began with one employee or a group
of employees quitting a ﬁrm and starting their own ﬁrm. This process of separating from a parent
ﬁrm and starting one’s own ﬁrm seems particularly prevalent in innovative industries. It is this
process our model is designed to explain. Our theory does not make a deep distinction between
spin-oﬀs and startups — that is, new entrants not necessarily associated with an incumbent ﬁrm.
Nevertheless, we prefer to think of new entrants as spin-oﬀs because all new entrepreneurs are
workers in some ﬁrm and, in our theory, only these agents have new ideas.
Our results imply that the best ideas are the ones that lead to spin-oﬀs, while the ideas that are
not as good are implemented in existing ﬁrms. This implies that, on average, proﬁts from the ﬁrst
product of a ﬁrm should be higher than the proﬁts from the subsequent products a ﬁrm decides
to produce. This is consistent with some of the available evidence, which suggests that the ﬁrst
product of a ﬁrm is, on average, the most successful of its products. Prusa and Schmitz (1994)
argue that this is the case in the PC software industry. The ﬁrst product of a ﬁrm sells, on average,
1.86 times the mean product in its cohort, while the second product sells only 0.91 times the mean
product in its cohort. That is, ﬁrst products are, on average, about twice as successful as second
products. The ﬁrst product is also about twice as successful as the third, fourth, and ﬁfth products.
This evidence suggests that spin-oﬀs discriminate more than incumbent ﬁrms in choosing which
projects to implement. This is exactly in line with the selection mechanism our theory underscores.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and proves some
4basic results. Section 3 characterizes the selection of projects and the market for ideas. Section 4
derives the invariant distribution of ﬁrm sizes and compares the invariant distributions obtained in
the model to the US data. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model





where u(ct) is strictly increasing, concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable and bounded. In Section
3 below we will study two particular cases: the case with linear utility, u(c)=c, and the case with
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility, u(c)=−ae−bc.
Agents work in two occupations. They can be entrepreneurs or workers. A worker earns w>0
each period working for an entrepreneur (plus the value they extract from their ideas). There is
a perfectly elastic supply of workers at this wage w. Agents do not have a technology to save so
they consume what they earn each period. Entrepreneurs earn and consume proﬁts, and the wage
they receive from the project they work for directly. A worker can become an entrepreneur if, while
working for a ﬁrm, he has an idea and decides to spin oﬀ the ﬁrm.
An idea is a non-replicable technology to produce consumption goods using labor, speciﬁcally,
an idea uses 1 unit of labor.1 Consider an entrepreneur who owns a ﬁrm with N ∈ {1,2,..} ideas.
Then his one-period proﬁts are given by
π(S,N)=N (S − w)
where S = 1
N
PN
i=1 Pi denotes the average revenue and Pi the per period income generated from a
particular idea. We assume that Pi > 0 with probability one.
We assume that in each period the probability of a worker getting an idea is λ. An entrepreneur
does not get ideas but buys ideas from workers. An entrepreneur can learn of an idea for sale
with probability 0 <γ (λ,N) < 1. For now, we do not take a stand on the speciﬁcation of γ(·)
but assume, as seems natural, that the probability of learning about an idea in any given period is
1We assume that ideas are non-replicable technologies in order to determine the scale of each project. If technologies
are replicable, we would need a demand structure and goods diﬀerentiation to limit the size of each project. This
simple extension would complicate our framework with no new insights.
5increasing in λ and N. We will have more to say about the speciﬁcation of γ (·) at the beginning
of Section 4. In particular, in equilibrium, the number of ideas an entrepreneur learns about — the
demand for ideas — must be equal to the number of ideas generated by workers — the supply of ideas.
As we show below, equilibrium in the market for ideas will determine the average probability of an
entrepreneur learning about an idea but not the distribution of probabilities among them. Thus, if
we write γ(λ,N)=θ˜ γ (λ,N),θwill be an equilibrium object (the average probability of an entre-
preneur learning about an idea) and ˜ γ(·) (the distribution of probabilities among entrepreneurs) is
a primitive of our economy which we will specify as λN in Section 4.
The mean payoﬀ per period from the idea is μ, which is private information to the originator
of the idea. The mean payoﬀ is drawn from a continuous distribution H(μ) with H0(μ) > 0 for all
μ ≥ 0. The actual payoﬀ is drawn from a distribution Fμ(P) where
Z
f (P)dFμ (P)
is increasing in μ for all increasing functions f, Fμ (0) = 0 all μ, and
Z
PdFμ (P)=μ.
We also assume that Fμ is continuous with respect to μ and
lim
μ→∞Fμ(w)=0 .
The realization of P for a given idea can be discovered by implementing the idea for one period.
As mentioned above, entrepreneurs do not get ideas as they are involved in the management
of their ﬁrm, but they can buy ideas from workers. An entrepreneur who has bought an idea can
pay w to try it out for one period and observe the realization of P. If he does, he will use the idea
to produce as long as his future expected utility from doing so is greater than from dropping it.
Entrepreneurs may decide to implement a project even if the stream of proﬁts is negative (P<w ),
since having an extra project implies that they may generate more ideas in the future (although
this will not happen in equilibrium, as we show below).
A worker who has had an idea this period has two potential uses for it. He can sell his idea to
an entrepreneur, in which case he reveals the mean payoﬀ to the entrepreneur who buys it. In this
case he earns a wage w plus the price Z at which he sells the idea. The idea is then owned by the
entrepreneur and he decides to try it out or not.
He can also leave with the idea and become an entrepreneur of a ﬁrm with only this idea: a
spin-oﬀ. Note that in the market of ideas, the price of an idea has to be non-contingent on the
6quality of the idea. The reason is that any contingent contract would give the worker an incentive
to lie about the quality of the idea. So the only incentive-compatible price is independent of quality,
in which case the agent is indiﬀerent between revealing the true quality of the idea or not. Since this
information is useful for the entrepreneur, we assume that the worker does reveal the true quality.
The price of an idea Z is determined in equilibrium, where all entrepreneurs will be indiﬀerent
between buying ideas or not. Given this indiﬀerence we will further assume that transaction costs
(or search costs) are such that entrepreneurs end up buying ideas generated within the ﬁrms.
The implementation of an idea and the return that it generates are speciﬁc to the entrepreneur
of the ﬁrm that implements it. That is, without the entrepreneur who implemented the idea, the
project has zero value. Hence, projects are entrepreneur-speciﬁcb u t ,i m p o r t a n t l y ,n o tw o r k e r -
speciﬁc.2 We are also implicitly assuming that there is no contract in which the distribution of the
gains from an idea is done ex-post. That is a contract contingent on realizations. To the extent
that such a veriﬁcation process is costly, workers and entrepreneurs will prefer our current market
setup, particularly if we assume that the cost of writing these contracts is positive and therefore
larger than the zero cost of setting up a new ﬁrm through a spin-oﬀ. If setting up a new ﬁrm was
costly, we would need the cost of writing these contracts to be higher than the cost of setting up a
new ﬁrm. Even though we do not have any direct evidence that writing these contracts may be as
costly as setting up a new ﬁrm, conceptually there is little diﬀerence between a new ﬁrm and part
of a ﬁrm that is run independently and the realized proﬁts are distributed to the generator of the
idea, who is not the entrepreneur. Hence, in what follows we just assume that the cost of contracts
contingent on realizations is positive and the ﬁxed cost of setting up a new ﬁrm is zero.
2.1 An Entrepreneur’s Problem
Consider the problem of an entrepreneur with average revenue S, coming from N old ideas, who
owns one new idea with mean payoﬀ μ. If the entrepreneur tests the idea, his value function is
V (μ,S,N)=
Z














This period, his expected utility is the result of consuming the proﬁts from the accumulated used
projects π(S,N), his wage w, the price of the idea Z, and the random realization of proﬁts from the
2The idea is that the entrepreneur has some speciﬁc knowledge necessary to generate output from a particular
implementation of an idea.
7new project P −w. Note that the distribution from which P is drawn has expected value μ.D e n o t e
by W (S,N) the continuation value of an entrepreneur with N projects with average revenue S.I f
the entrepreneur uses the project, next period he will manage a ﬁrm with N+1projects and average
revenue (NS+ P)/(N +1 ) . If he does not use it, next period his continuation value stays constant
at W (S,N). The continuation value (or the value without any new idea) of an entrepreneur with
N projects with average revenue S is given by
W(S,N)=γ (λ,N)
Z μH
max[V (μ,S,N),u(π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N)]dH(μ)




max[V (μ,S,N) − u(π(S,N) − Z + w) − βW(S,N),0]dH(μ)
+(1 − γ (λ,N)H (μH))[u(π(S,N)+w)+βW(S,N)]
+γ (λ,N)H(μH)[u(π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N)]
where μH denotes the mean revenue value at which workers leave the ﬁrm with their idea.3 The
probability of someone in this ﬁrm generating an idea next period is γ (λ,N).I f a n e m p l o y e e
has an idea, he can leave and set up his own ﬁr m . H ew i l ld os oa sl o n ga st h ei d e ai sg o o d
enough, μ ≥ μH. If the entrepreneur has the idea, in order to implement it, he has to hire a worker
and communicate to him what he knows about the idea. If the idea is good enough, the worker
will leave the ﬁrm and set up his own ﬁrm, too. Hence, ideas get implemented within the ﬁrm
only if μ<μ H, independent of who has them. Given that an idea of expected revenue μ was
generated, the value of implementing it is, as discussed above, given by V (μ,S,N).T h e v a l u e
of not implementing the idea is given by u(π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N), namely, the utility of
consuming proﬁts and wage today and paying the price for the idea, plus the same continuation
value tomorrow. An idea will not be implemented if it provides a very low expected value. If no
one has an idea or if the idea is good enough to generate a spin-oﬀ, the value of the entrepreneur
is given by u(π(S,N)+w)+βW(S,N), since he does not pay for the idea. One of these scenarios
happens with probability 1 − γ (λ,N)H (μH).
T h en e x tl e m m as h o w st h a tt h ec o n t i n u a t i o nv a l u eW(S,N) exists and is increasing and con-
tinuous in average revenue S. We then show in Lemma 2 that the value of an entrepreneur with
3Note that we are already assuming that workers spin oﬀ when they get an idea with μ>μ H.B e l o ww ep r o v e
that this is, in fact, the case. In the meantime, all our arguments remain unaﬀected if we were to deﬁne a set MH
that includes the μ’s for which agents spin oﬀ. Then the integrals above would integrate over all values of μ that are
not in MH.
8an idea μ, V (μ,S,N) is increasing and continuous in the expected value of the idea μ a n di nt h e
average return S.
Lemma 1 W(S,N) exists and is strictly increasing in S.
Proof. Let C be the space of bounded continuous functions deﬁned on R × N. Deﬁne the
operator T(W):C → C as
T (W)(S,N)=γ (λ,N)
Z μH
max[V (μ,S,N) − u(π(S,N) − Z + w) − βW(S,N),0]dH(μ)
+(1 − γ (λ,N)H (μH))[u(π(S,N)+w)+βW(S,N)]


















It is easy to show that T is a contraction using Blackwell’s conditions. It satisﬁes monotonicity
since W ≤ W0 implies that T (W) ≤ T (W0) (all expressions above are increasing in the function
W). It satisﬁes discounting, since for a>0
T (W + a) ≤ βa+ T (W)
where β<1.H e n c e ,T is a contraction by the Contraction Mapping Theorem and a unique ﬁxed
point to the operator T exists.
Suppose W is strictly increasing in S.S i n c eS appears only in π and W in the deﬁnition of T,
T (W) is also strictly increasing in S. Hence, by the Contraction Mapping Theorem the ﬁxed point
of T is strictly increasing in S.
To show that W is continuous in S, note that since the space of continuous functions is closed
in the sup norm, we can apply the same argument to show continuity given that π is continuous in
S, Fμ is continuous in μ, and H(μ) is continuous in μ.
Lemma 2 V (μ,S,N) exists and is strictly increasing and continuous in μ and S.
Proof. By Lemma 1 W(S,N) exists and therefore V (μ,S,N) exists. Since π(S,N)+w −w +
P −Z is strictly increasing in P,t h eﬁrst term in V is strictly increasing in μ, since
R
f (P)dFμ (P)













is strictly increasing in μ, which proves the result.
That V is strictly increasing in S follows from W being strictly increasing in S.
To show that V is continuous in μ and S, note that by Lemma 1, W(S,N) is continuous in S,
the maximum of continuous functions is continuous, and Fμ is continuous with respect to μ.
An entrepreneur will implement an idea with expected revenue μ if
V (μ,S,N) >u (π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N).
Let μL (S,N) be the value of μ that solves
V (μL,S,N)=u(π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N). (1)




max[V (μ,S,N) − u(π(S,N) − Z + w) − βW(S,N),0]dH(μ)
+(1 − γ (λ,N)H (μH))[u(π(S,N)+w)+βW(S,N)]





[V (μ,S,N) − u(π(S,N) − Z + w) − βW(S,N)]dH(μ)
+γ (λ,N)H(μH)[u(π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N)]
+(1 − γ (λ,N)H (μH))[u(π(S,N)+w)+βW(S,N)]
The next lemma shows that there exists a unique function μL (S,N) that satisﬁes equation (1).
Lemma 3 There exists a unique function μL (S,N) that satisﬁes equation (1).
10Proof. First note that given our assumption that Fμ (0) = 0 all μ we know that μ ≥ 0. Then
V (0,S,N)=u(π(S,N) − Z)+βW(S,N) <u (π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N)
since w>0. In contrast,
lim
μ→∞V (μ,S,N)= l i m
μ→∞
Z














>u (π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N).











is non-negative. Hence since V (μ,S,N) is strictly increasing and continuous in μ, by the Mean
V a l u eT h e o r e mt h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u es c a l a rμL that satisﬁes (1) for each pair (N,S).L e tμL (S,N)
be the unique function that takes this value given a pair (S,N).
2.2 A Worker’s Problem






The continuation value of a worker currently working in a ﬁrm, W0,i st h e ng i v e nb y
W0 = λ
Z
max[V0(μ),u(w + Z)+βW0]dH(μ)+( 1− λ)[u(w)+βW0].
Using arguments similar to the ones used above for V , we can show that V0(μ) is strictly
increasing in μ. A worker with an idea μ will leave the ﬁrm and become an entrepreneur if
V0(μ) >u (w + Z)+βW0
Let μH be the value of μ that solves
V0(μH)=u(w + Z)+βW0. (2)
Thus, if μ>μ H the worker will leave his employer and set up a new ﬁrm. The continuation value




V0(μ)dH(μ)+( 1− λ)[u(w)+βW0]+λH (μH)(u(w + Z)+βW0).
11We show formally below that there exists a unique threshold μH.N o t ea l s ot h a tμH is a constant
and so it is independent of the characteristics of the ﬁrm (S,N) in which the agent works.
Lemma 4 There exists a unique value μH that satisﬁes equation (2). Furthermore V0(μ) is in-
creasing and continuous in μ.
Proof. We ﬁrst need to show that V0 is increasing and continuous in μ, but this follows directly
from Fμ being continuous and increasing in μ as assumed above. We also know that
V0(0) = u(0) + βW0 <u(w + Z)+βW0
since w + Z>0 and max[W (0,1),W 0]=W0. T h el a t t e ri st h er e s u l to ft h ef a c tt h a tan e w
entrepreneur with a project that pays 0 earns less than a worker and has fewer opportunities with
regard to exploiting his future ideas (he has exercised the option of spinning oﬀ). In contrast,
lim








Hence since V0(μ) is strictly increasing in μ and continuous by the Mean Value Theorem, there
exists a unique scalar μH that satisﬁes (2).
We still need to deﬁne the realized return needed in order to continue with a project once its









W (PH,1) = W0.
Then a ﬁrm keeps the project if the realized return is P ≥ PL (N,S) and a spin-oﬀ stays in
operation if the realized return on the idea that generated the spin-oﬀ is such that P ≥ PH. Note
that P<P H,t h es p i n - o ﬀ will exit and the would-be entrepreneur will return to the labor force
as a worker. In that case, given that the implementation of his project was speciﬁct oh i m ,t h e
project has zero resale value.
2.3 Equilibrium
A long-run equilibrium of this economy is a distribution of ﬁrm sizes δN, a list of four thresholds,
μL(·),μ H,P H and PL(·), a price of ideas, Z, and the average probability with which an entrepreneur
12buys an idea, θ,( w h e r eθ is given by γ(λ,N)=θ˜ γ(λ,N)) such that entrepreneurs solve the problem
in Section 2.1, workers solve the problem in Section 2.2 and the price, Z, and the average probability








where the l.h.s. is the supply of ideas and the r.h.s. is the demand for ideas. As we show in the next
section, the price Z will be such that entrepreneurs will be indiﬀerent about how many ideas to
buy. Therefore, market clearing will just require that the number of ideas bought by entrepreneurs
be equal to the number of ideas generated by workers. That is, market clearing simply determines
the value of θ (but not ˜ γ(λ,N) which is a primitive of the model). The price Z is the only price
at which entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent and so, for an arbitrary ˜ γ(λ,N), any other price will be
inconsistent with market clearing.
3 Characterization
In this section we characterize the thresholds on the expected revenue from an idea that determine
if an idea is thrown away, implemented by a particular ﬁrm, or results in a spin-oﬀ.F o rt h i s ,w e








We show in the Appendix that our main results hold under a CARA utility function as well. The
main reason to choose these two utility functions is that we can solve the value of an existing ﬁrm
in closed form given the additive separability or log additive separability of these utility functions.4
Under the assumption that the utility function is linear we can fully solve this problem in closed
form. The ﬁrst result shows that the threshold μL (S,N) is independent of S and N. μL (S,N)
independent of S i si m p l i e db yr i s kn e u t r a l i t y( o r ,i nt h eC A R Ac a s eb e l o w ,b yt h ef a c tt h a tr i s k
does not depend on the level of wealth). μL (S,N) constant in N is the result of the market for
ideas. Since workers will sell their ideas to whoever is willing to pay more for them, and there is a
relative scarcity of ideas, workers extract all the surplus of an idea and we can solve for the price
4Note that none of these speciﬁcations of the utility functions satisfy the bounded assumption we made in Section
2. However, since in these two cases we can solve the functional equation for W(S,N) analytically, it follows from
Theorem 9.12 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) that the solution is, in fact, optimal.
13of an idea in equilibrium. The proposition also yields the result that in equilibrium PL = w,a n d
so entrepreneurs use all projects that give positive returns. In contrast, PH >wand so spin-oﬀs
use projects that give strictly positive returns. The reason is that new entrepreneurs that start a
ﬁrm with a project with a low realized return have the option of going back to work for a ﬁrm and
start a new ﬁrm in the future with a better project. The proposition also shows that the threshold
for implementing ideas through spin-oﬀs is greater than the one for implementing ideas within the
ﬁrm, μL <μ H.T h i si se s s e n t i a l l yt h er e s u l to ft h eﬁxed capital cost of setting a new ﬁrm in the
case of linear utility. Inventors are more selective with the ideas they use when they spin oﬀ than
are ﬁrms. This also implies that some ideas within the ﬁrm do not result in spin-oﬀs and so some
ﬁrms grow. An industry’s growth is then the result of entry through spin-oﬀs and growth in the
intensive margin. With risk-averse CARA agents, this is the result of the larger risk faced by agents
that spin oﬀ.
Proposition 5 If u(ct)=ct, then in equilibrium
• μL (S,N) is independent of S and N,a n dμL (S,N) <w ,
• the thresholds for using a project are given by PL (S,N)=w and PH = w +f0 >wfor some
positive constant f0.
• μL <μ H, so some ideas are implemented within existing ﬁrms and some through spin-oﬀs,










max[P − w,0]dFμ(P)]dH(μ) > 0. (4)
Proof. Guess



























+(1 − γ (λ,N)H (μH))[π(S,N)+w + βW(S,N)]
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That is, it makes the value function of entrepreneurs equal to the present value of the current project
of the ﬁrm. So entrepreneurs are willing to pay up to Z for workers’ ideas, and workers will get this
price or will sell the idea to another entrepreneur. Competition for ideas among entrepreneurs then
guarantees that the market price of ideas Z is determined by the condition above in equilibrium.
Then
V (μL,S,N)=( π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N)






max[P − w,0]dFμL(P)=0 , (5)
and therefore is independent of S and N. Hence, μL <w ,since entrepreneurs can drop the idea
next period (the maximum in the second term on the l.h.s.). PL satisﬁes
max[P − w,0] > 0 for P>P L,





















































max[P − w − f0,0]dFμ(P),0
¸
dH(μ)+(1−λ)Z (6)
which determines f0 as a positive constant (given H assigns positive mass to μ’s such
R
(P − w)Fμ(P) >


















V0(μH)=w + Z + βW0






max[P − w − f0,0]dFμH(P)=Z,
Two results are immediate from this expression. First, since Z ≥ 0 and f0 > 0 the left-hand
side of the above equation evaluated at μH = μL is less than the right-hand side given that μL is
determined by Equation (5). Since the left-hand side is increasing in μ, it follows that μL <μ H.
Second, since PH is such that P − w − f0 =0 , it follows that PH = w + f0 >w .
The key insight in the previous proposition is that the selection of the ideas implemented in
existing ﬁrms, which is given by μL and μH, is independent of S and N. Because of this, the set of
ideas that will be implemented within each ﬁrm is independent of the ﬁrm’s size. It is the market
16for ideas that leads to this result. In the absence of these markets, entrepreneurs of existing ﬁrms
will appropriate some of the surplus of a given idea. Then, as long as γ (λ,·) is not linear in N,a
large ﬁrm with many projects will have more/less incentives to implement ideas than smaller ﬁrms.
The type of scale dependence will depend on the concavity or convexity of the function γ (λ,·) in
N. If the probability of getting new ideas is concave in N, large ﬁr m sw i l lb em o r es e l e c t i v ea n d
will therefore implement ideas with a higher expected return than entrepreneurs in small ﬁrms.
The reverse is true if γ (λ,·) is convex. This is not the case when entrepreneurs pay the market
price Z of an idea in the market. In this case the expected beneﬁts for all entrepreneurs is zero,
and so the selection of projects in equilibrium is independent of the shape of the function γ (λ,·)
and therefore of the scale of the ﬁrm. This is the sense in which the market for ideas is key to
generating scale independence in the selection of ideas.
In order for ﬁrm growth to be scale independent we need the thresholds μL and μH to be
independent of the size of the ﬁrm. We also need the number of innovations bought by a given ﬁrm
in the market of ideas to be proportional to its size. In our theory, as long as the unconditional
probability (λ) that a worker has an idea is independent of ﬁrm size, we obtain that the two
thresholds are independent of size. In order for ﬁrms to buy projects at a rate proportional to
their size, we will assume a linear probability of learning about ideas, γ (λ,N)=θλN,w h e r eθ
is determined by equalizing the demand and supply of ideas. In eﬀect, we are assuming that an
entrepreneur learns about ideas for sale through all the agents working in his ﬁrm, including himself.
This may be the result of workers having ideas themselves and selling them to their manager, since
that may be easier than contacting an unknown manager or employees ﬁnding out about ideas for
sale in the market and informing their manager.5
Figure 1 summarizes what we have learned about ﬁrm behavior and ﬁrm entry. It shows
expected revenue μ in the real line. For projects above μH, ﬁrms’ workers spin oﬀ.A l l o t h e r
ﬁrms implement ideas with μ’s between μL and μH. An incumbent risk-neutral entrepreneur would
implement projects as long as they pay expected return w, so the diﬀerence between μL and w is
the result of an entrepreneur’s ability to drop the project next period (this ordering can change







(P − w)dFμL(P)=0 . (7)
The diﬀerence between μL and μH is the result of the option value of exiting and setting up a new
5In the particular case in which γ (λ,N)=˜ λ(λ)N and utility is linear, even without the market for ideas, μL
is independent of size. The market for ideas is necessary to obtain scale independence in the selection of ideas if
the utility function is not linear and/or γ (λ,·) is not linear in N. In the Appendix where we consider the case of
exponential utility this is evident.





Firms with one or more workers 
Figure 1: Figure 1: Selection of Ideas







(P − w − f0)dFμH(P)=Z. (8)
The diﬀerence between the two thresholds comes from the option value f0 given by equation (6) of
closing a new ﬁrm and starting another one later on with a better idea and the fact that workers
give up the price of an idea Z when they set up the ﬁrm. Note that if f0 =0 , the two threshold
equations and the equation for Z imply that Z =0and μL = μH. So, all projects would be
implemented via spin-oﬀs. However, as shown in the previous proposition, f0 is positive, since
workers can extract the value of very good projects by spinning oﬀ.N e wﬁrms will require a higher
return from their ﬁrst project than existing ﬁrms demand from new projects, given the larger option
value f0 that new ﬁrms have of returning to an old ﬁrm and spinning oﬀ in the future, namely,
PH >w= PL. Both of these equations imply that the number of entrants as a fraction of the
population is constant and so is the number of new projects implemented in existing ﬁrms each
period as a fraction of total population.
Finding an equilibrium amounts to solving equations (4), (6), (7) and (8) for the values of Z,
f0,μ L and μH. In the next proposition we show that an equilibrium exists and is unique.
Proposition 6 A long-run equilibrium for this economy exists and is unique
18Proof. To establish this proposition, observe that when Z =0 ,f 0 given by Equation (6) is
positive. Then, Equations (7) and (8) imply that if μH = μL, the l.h.s. of (8) is negative and hence
smaller than Z =0 . Now note that the l.h.s. of (8) is strictly increasing and continuous in μH as
is the r.h.s. However, observe that the derivative of the l.h.s. of Equation (8) with respect to μH
is strictly larger than the derivative of Z with respect to μH and the diﬀerence of both derivatives
is bounded away from 0, as Z is the average v a l u eo ft h el . h . s . o f( 8 )f o rt h ei n t e r v a l[μL,μ H].
Therefore, by the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists a unique μH that solves Equation (8).
Given μH we can immediately obtain a unique value of Z and f0. Furthermore, μL is uniquely
determined by Equation (7) since the r.h.s. of Equation (7) is strictly increasing and continuous in
μLand at μL =0t h er . h . s .i sl e s st h a nz e r o .
We still need to show that there exists a unique invariant distribution δN and an average
probability of entrepreneurs buying an idea θ. To show that there exists a unique θ given an
invariant distribution is immediate from Equation (3). Showing existence of a unique invariant
distribution is more involved and we dedicate the next section to it. In Corollary 8 we show that
in fact such a distribution exists and is unique.
As we noted above, one potential issue is the existence of an equilibrium with contingent con-
tracts, namely, a contract in which an entrepreneur oﬀers the worker the contingent return on an
idea minus w. Workers with good ideas that would otherwise spin oﬀ would be willing to stay if
the entrepreneur pays the cost of writing the contract. However, since we assumed that the cost of
the contract is positive, this is never optimal for the entrepreneur.
In the appendix, we show that all results, except μL <w ,hold when u(ct)=−ae−bct.I nt h i s
case all agents in the economy are risk averse. However, because their risk aversion does not depend
on the level of their wealth, in the presence of markets for ideas, we still obtain the result that μL
is constant, and therefore that the selection of projects is scale independent. In the CARA case
























4 Invariant Distribution of Firm Sizes
In order to derive the implications of our model for ﬁrm growth and the size distribution of ﬁrms,
we need to take a stand on the number of projects that ﬁrms buy in the market. The reason is
19that in our model entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent about how many ideas to buy. As argued above, we
can either specify the function γ (·) and assume that entrepreneurs buy ideas in proportion to the
number of agents in the ﬁrm. This amounts to assuming that they ﬁnd out about ideas generated
by their own workers or, alternatively, they and their workers get information about ideas at a
constant rate per person.
Suppose that a ﬁrm with N projects has a probability of ﬁnding out about an idea given by
γ (λ,N)=θλN. We assume that the maximum size of a ﬁrm is given by N such that λN<1.6
Everyone in the ﬁrm has a probability λ>0 of generating an idea. Note that since the value
of λ depends on our deﬁnition of a period, we can always make λ small enough by appropriately
deﬁning the length of a period in the model. Correspondingly, we can make N arbitrarily large. In
case a ﬁrm hits the size constraint N, its workers will sell ideas to other ﬁrms. For the moment we
abstract from this problem, but we return to it below.
Given our speciﬁcation for γ(·) we need to choose θ such that the supply of ideas and the
demand for ideas equalize in equilibrium at price Z. Let δN denote the share of ﬁrms of size N in
equilibrium. We will discuss this distribution in much more detail below. Then, market clearing in








where the l.h.s. is the supply of ideas (N − 1 workers in a ﬁrm of size N have a probability λ of
generating an idea) and the r.h.s. is the demand for ideas (a ﬁrm of size N learns of and buys





Note that our assumption that the maximum size of ﬁr m si sg i v e nb yN implies an additional
adjustment for θ. Since ﬁrms get zero expected beneﬁts out of implementing ideas, entrepreneurs
are indiﬀerent about expanding or not. Hence, they do not care about this upper bound for the
size of their ﬁrm. The only role that this bound plays is to determine how other ﬁrms grow if there
is a positive mass of constrained ﬁrms. Thus, the only adjustment we need to make is to add the
upper bound N to Equation (9). Notice, however, that Equation (10) still holds.
6Alternatively we could work with continuous time and assume that the process by which ﬁrms generate ideas is
Poisson with parameter λN. This would imply an identical random process for generating ideas in continuous time.
Note that we are assuming that the process of generating ideas and the process of assigning knowledge and ownership
are independent. If instead each worker had an unconditional probability of generating an idea λ independently of
other workers, there would be a positive probability of generating several ideas per period, which we rule out.
20In order to derive the size distribution of ﬁrms, ﬁrst note that the size of the industry will
increase constantly in our setup, given that innovation does not stop (every worker in the industry
has probability λ of having an idea independently of where they work). On top of this the probability
of ﬁrms adding a project is positive for all ﬁrms, while the probability of dropping a project that
is already being used is zero. Hence, ﬁrms will also grow continuously. This is combined with a
positive mass of new entrants with one worker every period. We can show that there is an invariant
distribution of employment shares and ﬁrm sizes measured as a share of total employment. That
i s ,w en o r m a l i z eb yt h es i z eo ft o t a le m p l o y m e n t .
First consider the transition equation for a ﬁrm with N workers. Each worker has a probability
λ of having an idea. If they do, the ﬁrm implements it if μ ∈ [μH,μ L (N)] and if it implements it,








which by the arguments above does not depend on S.
In what follows we will ignore the upper bound on ﬁrm sizes N. We will return to it once we
deﬁne the invariant distribution of ﬁrm sizes for the case without this bound. Hence if p(N,N +1 )
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is positive if N ∈ A or N +1∈ A.
Let Lt be the total labor force and Et the total number of ﬁrms or enterprises in period t, and
let {δN} be the invariant distribution of ﬁrm sizes. The probability that a ﬁrm with N employees




(1 − Fμ (PH))dH (μ)
where PH satisﬁes
W (PH,1) = W0.
Hence, the expected number of spin-oﬀsi np e r i o dt+1given the distribution of ﬁrm sizes in period















(1 − Fμ (PH))dH (μ)Lt
≡ λHLt,
where λH denotes the number of new employees in new ﬁrms as a fraction of total employment.
Hence the expected number of spin-oﬀs is a constant fraction of the population, Lt.

















where λL denotes the number of new employees in old ﬁrms as a fraction of total employment.
Then, for Et large




=( 1 + λH)Lt + λLLt.
Given our deﬁnition of λL and λH, population evolves according to
Lt+1 =( 1+λH + λL)Lt
22Thus,




= Et + λHLt.
Hence the number of ﬁrms is expanding at a constant rate. In terms of number of ﬁrms, the
economy is growing at a constant rate. Note that we are assuming that Et is large enough so that
Lt and Et evolve deterministically. For small Lt and Et, however, both are random variables that
evolve according to a stochastic process.
We now compute the invariant distribution of the share of workers in ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes.
Let φN denote the probability that a worker is employed by a ﬁrm with N workers, given that the
probability that a worker has an idea that is used within the ﬁrm is given by λL independently of
the ﬁrm. Then, the invariant distribution satisﬁes
[φ1 (1 − λL)+λH]L = φ1L0 = φ1 (1 + λL + λH)L
or






for N =1 . Intuitively, the number of workers in ﬁrms of size 1 today, φ1L, minus the number of
workers in ﬁrms of size 1 that become workers in ﬁrms of size 2, φ1λLL, plus the number of new
workers in ﬁrms of size 1, λHL, is equal (in the invariant distribution) to the number of workers in
ﬁrms of size 1 tomorrow, φ1L0, which is equal to φ1 (1 + λL + λH)L, given that the growth rate of
employment is λL + λH.
Similarly, for ﬁrms of size N,
φN (1 − λLN)+φN−1λL (N − 1) + φN−1λL
= φN (1 − φLN)+φN−1λLN












λL (N − 1)
λH + λL (N +1 )
.
Note that by deﬁnition







φN (1 − λLN)+φN−1λL (N − 1) + φN−1λL
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and so the resulting φ’s form a probability distribution. This distribution is the invariant distri-
bution of population shares across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Simon and Bonini (1958) propose an
exogenous growth and entry process of ﬁrms that leads to the same type of distribution, namely, a
Yule distribution. This distribution approximates a Pareto in the upper tail.
Proposition 7 There exists a unique invariant distribution φ of employment shares across ﬁrm
sizes, where φN denotes the share of workers employed by ﬁrms of size N.
To obtain the distribution of ﬁrm sizes we need to transform the distribution of worker shares
into a distribution of ﬁrm sizes. For this, note that if the share of the population employed by ﬁrms















N < 1 and so δN is well deﬁned, exists, and is unique.
Corollary 8 There exists a unique invariant distribution δ of ﬁrm sizes.
Note from the previous equations that the distributions φ and δ depend only on the value of
the ratio λH/λL. Note also that in the theory N ≤ N. Hence, in order to get distributions of
24employment shares and ﬁrm sizes that are consistent with the theory we need to re-normalize both














Now consider the expected growth rate of employment, gN, of a ﬁrm of employment size N.
The ﬁrm grows by one employee with probability NλL,t h u s
gN =
(N +1 )NλL + N (1 − NλL) − N
N
= λL = θλ
Z μH
μL
(1 − Fμ (PL))dH (μ)
Hence, the expected growth rate of ﬁrms is just given by the probability per worker of its employees
generating an idea that is used. This probability is constant, so the expected growth rate in terms
of employees of existing ﬁrms is constant, which is a statement of Gibrat’s Law. Therefore, the
model seems to be consistent with the evidence in Sutton (1997).
Proposition 9 T h ee x p e c t e dg r o w t hr a t ei ne m p l o y m e n ts i z eo fe x i s t i n gﬁr m si si n d e p e n d e n to f
their size.
Similarly, the expected growth rate in average revenue of a ﬁrm with average revenue S and N




































PdFμ (P)dH (μ) − λL
#
.
This implies that, as μL and PL, and therefore λL, are independent of N that
ES (gS,N)=0 .
25So average growth rates across ﬁrms of diﬀerent average revenues are zero. However, large ﬁrms
that have had good realizations and therefore have a high S will tend to grow slower, and vice
versa. In this sense there will be reversion to the mean, conditional on number of employees. Also
note that the variance of gS (S,N) is decreasing in N, since the larger the ﬁrm, the smaller the
contribution of new projects. Since ﬁrms implement projects that yield only non-negative proﬁts,




λH + λL (N +1 )
it is immediate that as N →∞or λ → 0, when N → N, φN ≈ φN−1, so the share of workers at
large ﬁrms is approximately constant. This implies that the density of ﬁrm sizes will be proportional
to 1/N as N becomes large. That is, the tail of the distribution will be arbitrarily close to the tails
of a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one. Similarly if λH is small, φN ≈ φN−1 (N/(N +1 ) ),
and so for N large φN ≈ φN−1 and the distribution of ﬁrm sizes is approximately Pareto with
coeﬃcient one. This is interesting given that several authors have concluded that the upper tail
of the distribution of enterprise sizes is close to a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one (see, for
example, Axtell (2001)). We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 As λ → 0,o rN →∞ , the density of ﬁrm sizes is arbitrarily close to the density of
a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one, for large enough ﬁrm sizes. Furthermore, the distribution
of ﬁrm sizes is closer to a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one, the smaller the mass of workers
in new ﬁrms, λH.
The invariant distribution of ﬁrm sizes, as well as any other outcome of the model, is a function
of the exogenous parameters and distributions in the model, namely, β, w, and the distributions Fμ
and H. However, as we show above, the eﬀect of all those variables can be summarized through the
values of λL and λH. We can therefore assign particular values to these two variables and compute
the resulting distribution of employment shares and ﬁrm sizes. Figure 2 illustrates the invariant
distribution in this model and compares it with the distribution of ﬁrm sizes in 2000 in the US. In
order to compute the distribution given in equation (13), we need to truncate the distribution of
ﬁrm sizes at a certain size. We choose N = 500000, since the largest ﬁrms reported in the data have
this number of employees. We choose λH/λL =1 /9 and so 90% of the new employees are hired by
existing ﬁrms and 10% by new ﬁrms. As is evident from equations (11) and (12), the distribution
depends only on the ratio λH/λL and not on λH and λL separately.






































Model: Firm Size Distribution
Data: Firm Size Distribution
Figure 2: Model vs. Data
Figure 2 shows how our model can do a good job in matching the distribution of ﬁrm sizes.
Relative to a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one (a straight line with slope minus one), it
exhibits a relatively thinner tail of small ﬁrms. Furthermore, since in the model and in the data we
are truncating the distribution, both distributions exhibit thinner tails than the Pareto distribution
for very large sizes. This is only the result of truncation in the model. If we let N →∞ ,t h e n
the theory implies that the upper tail will be arbitrarily close to the Pareto distribution for large
enough sizes. Similarly, in the data the census does not reveal the sizes of the largest ﬁrms because
of conﬁdentiality concerns. Furthermore, while in the model we do not have integer constraints
and so there are some ﬁrms at all sizes, in the data there cannot be any fractional ﬁrms, which
truncates the distribution as well. Hence, the reason to have a small mass of large ﬁrms on the
27upper tail is similar in the model and the data.





































Data: Firm Size Distribution
Model: Firm Size Distribution (Teams of Size 2.5)
Figure 3: Model vs. Data with Variable Team Size
O n en o t i c e a b l ed i ﬀerence between the distribution generated by the model and the distribution
generated in the data is that the theoretical distribution lies below the empirical one in Figure 2.
The reason for this is that in our setup, ideas are generated by one employee and not by teams of
employees. Similarly individual agents spin oﬀ, not teams of agents. This is clearly not true in the
data. Firms enter small, but not necessarily with one employee. Were we to assume that teams of
between 2 and 3 employees have ideas and spin oﬀ, we could shift the theoretical curve in Figure 2
so that it lies on top of the empirical one. Thus, the emphasis is on the shape, not the level of the
curves. This exercise is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3 uses a value of λH/λL =0 .0736. This value is the empirical counterpart of λH/λL
28in the US economy from 1989 to 2003. Namely, we calculated the net number of workers added
through new ﬁrms and divided it by the net number of workers added through existing ﬁrms. The
data come from the US Small Business Administration.




































Pareto with coefficient one
Figure 4: Comparative Statics
Figure 4 shows how we can modify the shape of the invariant distribution by changing the ratio
λH/λL. We illustrate this using N = 10000. The ﬁgure presents the cases for λH/λL =1 /2, 1/5,
1/10,a n d1/20. It is clear from the ﬁgure that as we increase the number of entrants (by increasing
λH/λL), we shift mass to the lower tail, and therefore, the slope of the curve in Figure 4 becomes
steeper. The distribution is farther way from a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one. However,
as we know from the previous proposition, if one increases N to large enough values, the shape
of the distribution approaches a Pareto distribution, as N increases, in all these cases. Figure 4
illustrates the invariant distribution for a large range of parameters. The empirical value of λH/λL
is as calculated above, equal to 0.0736. The variation in the distribution that results for low, and
29empirically relevant, values of λH/λL is, however, extremely small. Hence, the model can do a
good job of matching the empirical distribution for a wide range of realistic values of λH/λL. These
small diﬀerences in the distribution of ﬁrm sizes for a wide set of values of λH/λL in the empirically
relevant range may be the reason why the shape of the US distribution of ﬁrm sizes has changed
so little in the last 10 years.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We propose a theory of ﬁrm dynamics in which workers have ideas for new projects that can be
implemented inside existing ﬁrms or, at a cost, in new ﬁrms: spin-oﬀs. Workers have private
information about the quality of their ideas. Because of an adverse selection problem, workers
can sell their ideas to existing ﬁrms only at a price that is not contingent on their information.
Therefore, workers with very good ideas decide to spin oﬀ and set up a new ﬁrm. Since entrepreneurs
of existing ﬁrms pay a price for the ideas sold in the market that implies zero expected proﬁts, ﬁrm
growth is scale independent. This, we believe, is the main insight that comes out of the theory. It
is the existence of a market for ideas that leads to scale-independent growth and distributions of
ﬁrm sizes that resemble a Pareto distribution with coeﬃcient one in the upper tail.
Essentially, the theory produces a size distribution of ﬁrms that depends on all the parameters
and distributions of the model through the value of λH/λL only. The theory leads to a distribution
of ﬁrm sizes that depends only on λH/λL, which can be easily calculated from available data. In
Section 4 we calculated this parameter using US data and showed that one obtains a size distribution
that is hard to distinguish from the empirical distribution. Furthermore, in the empirically relevant
range the distribution in the model is not very sensitive to the value of λH/λL. This could explain
why the distribution of ﬁrm sizes has been so stable over time.
In this paper we have abstracted from equilibrium eﬀects that can be important in the evolution
of an economy. Namely, we assumed throughout that the base wage of workers is ﬁxed. Of course,
workers also earn the return on their ideas and so part of their income is endogenous in the model.
Nevertheless, we worked with a modeled economy in which new workers can always be hired at the
wage w. Embedding this theory of ﬁrm dynamics and entry into an equilibrium framework, such
as the neoclassical growth model, where one can study the interactions between industry evolution
and wages as well as the growth of an industry or the economy would be interesting, but it is left
for future research.
30Furthermore, if spin-oﬀs tend to be geographically close to their parent ﬁrm, then they are a
potentially important reason why we get clusters of ﬁrms working in the same line of business in the
same locality. Augmented by a location choice, our theory could then form the basis of a dynamic
theory of industrial agglomeration.
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326A p p e n d i x
In this Appendix, we prove the analog of Proposition 5 for the case of exponential utility. We are
interested in this case because as in the linear case the value functions can be solved analytically
w h i c ha l l o w su st oo b t a i na ne x p r e s s i o nf o rt h ep r i c eo fa ni d e a .F u r t h e r m o r e ,i nc o n t r a s tw i t ht h e
linear case, with exponential utility agents are not risk neutral and, most importantly, without the
market for ideas the thresholds would depend on the size of ﬁrms. That is, absent a market for ideas
the selection of ideas would be ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Hence, this case further illustrates the importance of
the market for ideas in generating scale independent growth.
Proposition 11 If u(ct)=−ae−bct,
• μL (S,N) is independent of S and N,
• the thresholds for using a project are given by PL (S,N)=w and a constant PH (S,N) >w ,
























• and μL <μ H, so some ideas are implemented within existing ﬁrms and some through spin-oﬀs.
Proof. Guess that
W (S,N)=−ae−b[π(S,N)+w]f(N)







































































































































so entrepreneurs are willing to pay up to this amount for workers’ ideas, and workers will get this
price or will sell the idea to another entrepreneur. Competition for ideas among entrepreneurs then
guarantees that the condition is satisﬁed.
The threshold μL (S,N) is implicitly deﬁned by
V (μL (S,N),S,N)=u(π(S,N) − Z + w)+βW(S,N)



















which determines μL as a constant.














and so PL = w.































































which determines f0 as a positive constant, where f0 < 1/(1 − β) and veriﬁes our guess.










−e−b(P−w) +( 1− β)f0,0
i
dFμH(P)=−e−bZ.
35The equation above implies that PH satisﬁes
e−b(PL−w) =( 1− β)f0 < 1
since f0 < 1/(1 − β). Hence, we conclude that PL >w .
To show that μH >μ L, we need to compare the equations that determine these thresholds,
namely,
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which implies that μH >μ L.
36